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The Federal Courts and
Constitutional Interpretation
A Second Amendment Case Study
Mark Kemper

During the recent presidential election campaign,
political commentators and voters speculated on the
type of jurists that the candidates would, if elected,
nominate to serve in the federal judiciary.
Unsurprisingly, since it sits at the apex of the federal
judiciary, most attention was placed on the type of
Supreme Court justices the candidates would select.
At the moment, 5 members of the Supreme Court are
age seventy or older, so there is a significant likelihood
that President-elect Barack Obama will have the
opportunity to nominate at least 1 or 2 persons to fill
vacancies on that court. And, on a court that has
decided many of its most important cases over the last
several years by either 5–4 or 6–3 votes, altering the
direction of 1 or 2 votes is important; it means that Mr.
Obama’s ability to influence the direction of constitutional policy enunciated by the Supreme Court (and the
federal judiciary in general) could be immense.
Concern with how the new president can, through his
nominations of federal judges, influence the nation’s
public policy was on display at one campaign event at
which both candidates appeared, and during which the
host asked the candidates which members of the
current Supreme Court he would not have nominated.
The answers were telling. Barack Obama said he would
not have nominated Clarence Thomas because he did
not think that Justice Thomas possessed the distinguished legal resumé to merit an appointment to the
U.S. Supreme Court. One might speculate on why
Mr. Obama, the more liberal of the two major party
candidates running for president, chose Justice Thomas.
Is it because Justice Thomas happens to cast more
conservative votes than any other member of the
current Supreme Court? In contrast, John McCain
said that he would not have nominated Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, David Souter, and John
Paul Stevens. These justices, perhaps (not) coincidentally, are the 4 who cast the most liberal votes in cases,
and thus constitute the entire left flank of the current
Supreme Court.
What do these answers provided by Obama and
McCain say about the presidential candidates’ views
(and, by extension, the views of public officials in
general) about the proper role of courts in our political

system, about how courts should decide cases, and
about the type of judicial philosophies that judges
should possess? In particular, are presidents and
members of the U.S. Senate (the body that must
confirm, by a majority vote, a president’s nominations
to fill vacant judgeships) interested in finding the most
qualified and capable jurists? Or, alternatively, are
presidents, senators, and their political supporters more
concerned with finding individuals who have a propensity to decide cases consistent with a favored political
ideology? Perhaps political elites believe that both goals
are possible, and that judges
who use the “proper method”
of judicial decision making—
and thus fulfill the definition
of “qualified and capable”—
will have a natural propensity
to decide cases consistent
with a particular political
ideology?
To help answer these questions, one must first identify
the various types of methods
that one would want judges to use when identifying
and interpreting the laws that are relevant to the
resolution of cases appearing before their respective
courts. This is a substantial undertaking. In an effort to
make it more manageable, we can narrow our focus to
identifying the methods that we think judges might use
when they interpret constitutional provisions. After all,
many people are most concerned with the authority
that judges have to interpret the U.S. Constitution and
the power that that gives them to shape public policy
in the United States. So this seems like a good place
to start.
What types of legal methods, or “tools,” might judges
use to interpret constitutional provisions? What devices
do they have in their “tool box of constitutional
interpretation”? There are many possible interpretive
tools, but many students of law agree that a focus on a
constitution’s text, its original understanding at the
time it was enacted, legal precedent (i.e., case law), and
the nation’s historical practices and traditions are
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legitimate factors for consideration by judges. Legal
scholars might disagree about how much each of these
interpretive tools should be emphasized, as well as what
constitutes the proper use of each tool, but they
typically agree that such tools constitute valid methods
for interpreting constitutional provisions. More
controversial are the arguments encouraging judges to
incorporate into their constitutional decisions the latest
developments in political, economic, and moral
philosophy, general pragmatic considerations about
what constitutes “good public policy,” the domestic
legal policies of foreign nations, and the various treaties
and agreements that comprise the vast realm of
international law.

case involving a constitutional challenge to
governmental actions. But, if one is seeking clarity,
the Constitution’s text can often disappoint. In fact,
even the provisions of the document that appear clear
on first inspection turn out to be fraught with potential
ambiguity. For example, the Constitution says that the
President must be 35 years of age. Simple enough. But
how do we know what constitutes the proper method
for calculating the age of a person running for that
office? When, precisely, does the age clock start? The
text of the Constitution does not tell us. This means
that we will have to go outside of the text to derive
meaning from even the most “simple” constitutional
provision.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in District of
Columbia vs. Heller, announced on June 26, 2008,
provides a useful example of the justices using several of
these tools of constitutional interpretation. Since the
Court was divided over the proper resolution of the
case, the Heller decision also illustrates how the justices
can use the same methods of constitutional interpretation to reach starkly different conclusions about the
correct interpretation of the law. At issue in Heller was
a District of Columbia regulation that prohibited
individuals, outside of a few narrow exceptions, from
possessing handguns either on their person or in their
homes. Heller, a resident of the District, wanted to carry
a firearm as well as keep it in his home, and so he
instigated a lawsuit in which he asked the courts to
issue an injunction prohibiting the District from
enforcing its firearms regulation against him and other
similarly situated residents.

Of course, this problem is compounded when the text is
manifestly ambiguous. The Second Amendment is this
type of text. As that amendment states: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.” In Heller, the majority argued
that settled principles of legal interpretation in the
United States require that the amendment be construed
by placing primary emphasis on the operative clause
that addresses the right of the people to “keep and bear
Arms,” and that the prefatory clause discussing a “well
regulated Militia” should be examined only to the
extent necessary to clarify ambiguities in the operative
clause. The one caveat is that judges should not
interpret the operative text in a way that contradicts
the prefatory text.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed Heller’s claim, after which he appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The appellate court subsequently ruled in his favor
by arguing that the Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution protects an individual’s right to possess
firearms, and that the D.C. handgun regulation was in
violation of this right. The District of Columbia
appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court and that
court affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling, concluding
that individuals have a constitutional right to possess
handguns in their homes and that complete bans on
such possession are unconstitutional. Let’s take a closer
look at how the majority and dissenting opinions in the
case used several of the interpretive tools mentioned
above to justify their very different conclusions about
the proper construction of the Second Amendment.
Constitutional Text
Not surprisingly, most people agree that an examination
of the Constitution’s text is the first place to start in a

So here we see the majority drawing instantly from
something outside of the text (i.e., the interpretive rule
about how judges should treat prefatory and operative
provisions in laws) to provide meaning to the Second
Amendment. The majority went on to argue that,
because there were no ambiguities in the meaning of the
operative clause given its original understanding at the
time of enactment (more on this below), the prefatory
clause had limited impact on the proper resolution of
this case. The majority also argued that the consistency
requirement between the prefatory and operative clause
was also satisfied, for recognizing that the operative
clause protects an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms is not inconsistent with the prefatory clause’s
focus on well-regulated Militias. After all, citizens who
possess firearms in their homes can readily participate in
a citizen militia.
In contrast, the dissenting justices thought that the
prefatory and operative clauses should be read together
(particularly since they thought the operative clause
was ambiguous), and that the meaning of the latter is
strongly shaped by the former. According to Justice
Stevens, the prefatory clause constitutes the overriding
purpose of the Second Amendment, and that purpose

was to protect the state’s interest in maintaining an armed militia comprised of its
citizens. State militias would serve to
counter any effort by the national government to institute a standing national army,
and to use that army in a tyrannical fashion
to destroy the sovereignty of state governments and the liberty of its citizens. The
amendment was not designed, nor was it
understood by citizens at the time of its
enactment, to constitutionalize an individual
right to possess firearms for one’s personal
defense.
Original Understanding
This brings us to the tool of original understanding. Justice Scalia, the author of the
majority opinion, wrote in Heller that “we
are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was
written to be understood by the voters; its words and
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning.’ Normal
meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning,
but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would
not have been known to ordinary citizens in the
founding generation.” According to Justice Antonin
Scalia and the other members of the majority, judges
should interpret the words in constitutional provisions
as they were generally and typically understood by
ordinary citizens at their respective time of enactment.
After examining founding era dictionary definitions of
words such as “keep,” “bear,” and “arms,” along with the
English common law, state constitutions, state and
federal statutes, and legal commentary circa 1791, the
Heller majority concluded that the Second Amendment
was designed to protect both state militias and the
individual’s right to use firearms to defend one’s home.
The majority emphasized how the founding generation
was aware of the historical tendency of governments to
disarm their citizens and then, using standing armies,
to impose tyrannical rule. And, again, since the
possession of firearms was useful toward the maintenance of state militias and self-defense, there is no
conflict between the prefatory and operative clauses
of the Second Amendment.
Reviewing the same historical record as the majority,
the four justices in dissent disagreed with the majority’s
conclusions about the founding era’s understanding of
the Second Amendment. In particular, they argued that
the term “bear arms” was typically understood as
bearing arms as a soldier in a military context, and that
the term “keep” was inseparable from the term bear—

it did not add anything to the Second Amendments
sole purpose of protecting state militias. As such, the
Second Amendment recognizes a collective right to keep
and bear arms, not the individual right that the
majority identifies.
The dissenting justices understood that individuals may
keep arms in their homes as part of a well-regulated
state militia so that they can “bear” them on a moments
notice when the militia is mustered as part of a
defensive effort to keep the peace in the state. Yet
because the drafters of the Second Amendment
recognized that state militias need to be well regulated
in order to be effective, they left it ultimately in the
hands of state governments to decide how firearms
should be distributed. As such, a state government
(but not the federal government) has the authority to
unilaterally limit the degree to which its citizens may
keep arms in their homes; in fact, as Judge Richard
Posner has noted, it might in some circumstances make
more public security sense for the state to store arms at
a central depot where they are easily retrieved rather
than let them be scattered throughout the land in
private homes. In short, the dissenting justices thought
that the Second Amendment, as ordinarily understood
at the time of its enactment, was designed to prevent
the federal government from disarming state militias.
Nor more, and no less.
Legal Precedent
The Heller majority examined 19th century case law, and
concluded that those “cases that interpreted the Second
Amendment universally support an individual right
unconnected to militia service.” The majority also
concluded that its interpretation of the Second
Amendment was not inconsistent with the limited
number of Supreme Court decisions interpreting that
amendment. The most important of these precedents is
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a 1939 case, United States vs. Miller, in which the Court
unanimously held that an individual could be prosecuted for violating a federal law prohibiting the transportation of certain guns across state lines. In that case,
Miller was prosecuted for transporting a sawed-off
shotgun, and the Court upheld his conviction by
emphasizing that the weapon was not one typically
used in a military context. In reviewing this case, the
Heller majority argued that the Miller decision was not
inconsistent with the notion that individuals have
Second Amendment rights to possess weapons for
self-defense, as long as those weapons have a reasonable
military use and are the type that are ordinarily
possessed by the citizenry (thus, sawed-off shotguns,
fully automatic machine guns, and shoulder-mounted
rocket launchers would not qualify). The majority
concluded that most handguns meet these two
requirements.
In contrast, the dissenting opinion in Heller thought
that the Miller precedent was based on the principle
that the Second Amendment was designed to protect
state militias, and that it did not in any way support the
idea that individuals have the right to possess firearms
independent from their participation in a state’s militia.
After all, the dissent argued, many firearms that do not
have a common military use could be used to protect
one’s personal safety inside or outside of their home
(including sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and,
conceivably, shoulder-mounted rocket launchers!).
Therefore, the Second Amendment’s sole mission must
be that of protecting state militias, otherwise the Miller
decision’s focus on weapons that are suitable for
military use does not make sense. If the amendment
was designed to protect both state militias and provide
for personal self-defense, then it would not be sensible
for courts to recognize only those weapons that are
useful for one of those purposes.
History and Tradition
The majority in Heller also spent considerable time
examining 18th, 19th and 20th century laws, legal
commentary and customs pertaining to the regulation
of firearms. On balance, it concluded from its analysis
that there was a long practice recognizing the individual's right to possess firearms—including handguns.
Indeed, the majority emphasizes that a culture of
handgun ownership has evolved to make handguns
“the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for
self-defense in the home.” In dissent, Justice Breyer took
issue with this approach. He wrote: “According to the
majority's reasoning, if Congress and the States lift restrictions on the possession and use of machine guns, and people
buy machine guns to protect their homes, the Court will have
to reverse course and find that the Second Amendment does, in
fact, protect the individual self-defense-related right to possess
a machine gun. On the majority's reasoning, if tomorrow

someone invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous
self-defense weapon, Congress and the States had better ban
it immediately, for once it becomes popular Congress will no
longer possess the constitutional authority to do so. In essence,
the majority determines what regulations are permissible by
looking to see what existing regulations permit. There is
no basis for believing that the Framers intended such
circular reasoning.”
What Legal Doctrine was Established
in Heller?
In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the majority
did not provide a clear enunciation of the rule or
standard that it was using to reach its conclusion that
the D.C. regulation violated the Second Amendment.
Yet a variety of standards exist that the Court might
have adopted. For instance, in some contexts courts will
assess the constitutionality of governmental actions by
applying what is known as the rational-basis test. When
using this test, the court asks whether the government
is acting in a way to promote its interests (which we
hope, in a democracy, are aligned with the public’s
interests!) by (1) exercising its authority to promote
government interests that are reasonably related to a
power granted to the government in the Constitution,
where (2) the law in question is rationally related to
furthering those interests. This is a very deferential
standard of judicial review and it normally results in a
court upholding the constitutionality of the government’s action. In Heller, the majority stated that the
Second Amendment requires a standard more demanding than rational-basis review, but it declined to specify
what that standard is.
Justice Breyer did not think that the majority was
advocating the adoption of the most stringent standard
of judicial review, commonly referred to as strict
scrutiny (although the majority didn’t explicitly say
that it was not using this standard). This standard of
review is used when a litigant challenges a government’s actions by arguing that the government has
infringed upon a fundamental constitutional right and/
or acted on the basis of “suspect” classifications (e.g., the
government has discriminated along racial/ethnic or
religious lines). When using strict scrutiny, a court will
evaluate whether the government has acted constitutionally by asking whether the government’s actions are
designed to promote a compelling state interest (not
just an ordinary, hum-drum state interest), and whether
its actions are narrowly tailored to promote that
interest (e.g., does the government encroach upon the
fundamental right or discriminate along racial or
religious lines more than is necessary to effectively
accomplish its compelling state interest). The court will
declare the government’s actions unconstitutional if it

concludes that the government is not seeking to further
a compelling interest or if the law is not narrowly
tailored to further that interest.
So, for the majority in Heller, the rational-basis test was
not sufficiently protective of the individual’s right to
“keep and bear arms,” while the strict scrutiny standard
was seemingly too protective. Since the Court did not
identify what standard of review or legal doctrine
would be employed in Second Amendment cases, one
can only guess that it is something in between rationalbasis review and strict scrutiny. Justice Beyer argued, in
dissent, that the Court should adopt an “interest
balancing” approach by asking “whether the statute
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent
that is out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects
upon other important governmental interests.” But
the majority did not think much of Justice Breyer’s
standard (referring to it as “judge-empowering” and a
“freestanding” approach that provides “no constitutional guarantee at all” to Second Amendment rights), and
instead explained that the standard of review in these
types of cases will need to be developed over time, on a
case-by-case basis, as the Court decides cases involving
Second Amendment challenges to firearms regulations.
Concluding Thoughts
The rule of law has many facets but one critical
component is that neutral judges decide cases based on
legitimate sources of law rather than their personal
policy preferences or some other arbitrary, non-legal
criteria. With this in mind, many of the tools of
constitutional interpretation are designed to constrain
the discretion that judges have when deciding constitutional cases. When judges encounter ambiguous
constitutional text, they are expected to turn to things
such as the text’s original understanding, legal precedent, and historical practice and tradition—as opposed
to considering their own ideological leanings or personal
biases. In Heller, we see both the majority and dissenting justices attempting to utilize such tools, yet, in
doing so, reaching very different conclusions.
One can speculate on why this is the case. For instance,
one might surmise that these tools are merely window
dressings designed to hide the fact that the personal
policy preferences of the justices are the principal forces
behind their votes. There is a significant body of
research arguing—and supporting with empirical
data—that this is indeed the case. Specifically, Judge
Richard Posner has questioned the validity of originalism as a tool of constitutional interpretation by arguing
that its results are typically the product of shoddy “law
office history,” and that it serves as nothing more than
“the historicizing glaze on personal values and preferences.” Yet Judge Posner does not offer an alternative

method for interpreting constitutional texts that does
not have its own serious problems—particularly that of
granting judges even more discretion than they have
when using the methods discussed above.
What we did not see in Heller was a member of the
Court resorting to some of the more controversial
methods for deriving the meaning of constitutional
text, such as by examining the domestic laws in other
nations or those of the international order, by examining current social mores and opinions (although to some
extent the Heller majority did this when it mentioned
the prevalence of handguns in the contemporary United
States) or by delving into the latest developments in
moral and political philosophy. These criteria have been
used by judges in other cases, but they often trigger
intense opposition from critics who contend that the
judges are exceeding their legitimate authority by not
applying previously established laws, and that they are
instead legislating from the bench (something that
many find inappropriate behavior for life-tenured
federal judges in a constitutional democracy premised
on the rule of law).
In any event, one thing is clear: citizens need to pay
more attention to what courts are doing and how
judges attempt to justify and explain their decisions.
Public officials and political activists have long recognized the importance of the judiciary and that is why
we hear the courts being discussed so frequently during
presidential campaigns. It also explains the vicious
battles over judicial nominations that we have witnessed during the last 25 years. For better or for worse,
the power that judges have to interpret the U.S.
Constitution gives them the ability to radically shape
the contours of public policy in the nation.
This is clearly demonstrated in the Heller case; the menu
of gun regulation policies available to federal policy
makers was truncated substantially by the Court’s
decision in that case (and if the decision is extended to
cover state and local governments—as most suspect it
will be—its effect on public policy will be even more
pronounced). But other areas of public policy can be
equally constrained (or unconstrained if the courts do
not limit the scope of governmental power) by the
constitutional decisions of courts. Consequently, it is
imperative that citizens pay critical attention to the
work of courts and judges if they want to preserve for
future generations the rights and liberties of individuals,
the republican system of government, and the core
principles of the rule of law that are provided by the
U.S. Constitution.
—Mark Kemper is Associate Professor of Political Science.
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